Fear has prevailed in the lives of Indonesians for much too long. The
reign of fear has affected both the state and ordinary people. Cognizant
of its credential deficit in both Islamic politics and democracy,
successive governments have felt compelled to demonstrate sympathetic
gesture to the Muslim communities, sometimes stronger than actually
believed.
To appreciate better the argument presented above, it is worth comparing
the behaviors of the past and present governments with those of former
president Abdurrahman "Gus Dur" Wahid. With abundant Islam credentials
in hand, never at any time did Wahid need to prove that he was
pro-Islam. So much so that he could afford to demonstrate the opposite.
Instead of calling for jihad against the enemies of Islam, Wahid did
almost the extreme opposite.
Flamboyantly he displayed some of the best possible favors a Muslim
leader could do for minority groups in a Muslim-majority nation. Not
only did he restore the ethnic Chinese's civil right to celebrate the
Chinese New Year, he even went as far as claiming to have some distant
Chinese ancestry.
In contradiction to the repressive rules and regulations from the old
regime, Wahid supported inter-religious marriage. He offered a public
apology to the victims of the 1965 killings and their families, as well
as to the people of East Timor for violence the previous government had
committed.
Until last April, my observation of Islamization was narrowly focused on
its effect on the secular state in Muslim-majority nation such as
Indonesia, and by extension Malaysia and Pakistan. But two recent and
separate analyses have helped me see things in a broader perspective.
The first comes from Iran-born Amir Taheri, and the second comes from
India-born Sadanand Dhume. Both are well traveled, and both have worked
for years as journalists.
In his article, "Why Islamists Don't Win Elections?" first published in
The Wall Street Journal,
Amir Taheri offers a long list of cases from many countries where the
Islamization of political parties has consistently led to election
defeats, including Malaysia, Indonesia, Pakistan, Bangladesh,
Afghanistan, Iran and Turkey. His conclusion is unequivocal:
"So far, no Islamist party has won a majority of the popular vote in any
of the Muslim countries where reasonably clean elections are held.
Often, the Islamist share of the votes has declined. In Malaysia, the
Islamists have never gone beyond 11 percent of the popular vote," Taheri
wrote.
"In Indonesia, the various Islamist groups have never collected more
than 17 percent. The Islamists' share of the popular vote in Bangladesh
declined from an all-time high of 11 percent in the 1980s to around 7
percent in the late 1990s. Even in once-Taliban dominated Afghanistan,
Islamist groups, including former members of the Taliban, have managed
to win only around 11 percent of the popular vote on the average. In the
Middle East and Arab nations Islamists don't fair much better," he
wrote.
It was my understanding that in response to perceived threats from the
opposition Partai Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS) in the late 1970s, the
incumbent United Malays National Organization (UMNO)-dominated
government underwent a face-lift, trying to appear to be more Islamic
than PAS.
I used to believe this at least partly explains UMNO's resilience.
Successive governments in Indonesia followed suit. But Taheri shows the
last elections in Malaysia gave the opposite outcome. PAS won more seats
(from 6 to 23), while UMNO suffered the most severe defeat since 1969.
Why? According to Taheri, UMNO's Badawi played "the Islamic card, while
PAS leader Abdul Hadi Awang went in the opposite direction".
Similar trends can be observed in Indonesia. Since his electoral victory
in 2004, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) has become
increasingly Islam-oriented. In contrast, the most overtly and strongest
Islamist party, the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), has consistently
traded in its Islamist look and agenda for more inclusive strategies and
rhetoric. Two questions follow. Has Malaysia's PAS taken the lesson
from the PKS? And why have President SBY's advisers not taken the lesson
from Badawi's defeat?
Sadanand Dhume is more pessimistic than Taheri or myself about the
possible outcomes of global Islamization. One country where Islamization
has been the focus of Dhume's examination is Indonesia. What has
worried Dhume is not just the safety of one or two minority groups
currently under attack. Rather, as he writes in a column in the
Journal,
"(w)hat kind of country does Indonesia want to be? Will it be, as its
founding fathers envisioned, a land where people of all faiths live as
equals, or one where non-Muslims and heterodox Muslims are effectively
second-class citizens? Will it be a country that respects an
individual's right to worship as he pleases, or indeed not to worship at
all, or one where such matters are determined by safari-suited
officials and bearded clerics? Will it be ruled by the law or by the
mob?"
At first, that sounds a very common concern among many moderate and
liberal Indonesians for the past few years. Dhume has just published his
first book,
My Friend the Fanatic, a product of four years of
travel in many parts of Indonesia and conversations with people of
diverse backgrounds. The book's title refers to an important figure in
Islamist circles who traveled with him and helped him open the doors to
other Islamist leaders and supporters.
In late May, Dhume visited Sydney and Melbourne for a writer's festival and a series of promotional activities for his book.
At the risk of being rude, I asked him what precisely is "new" in his
contribution to the ongoing debate over this matter. His response was
firm and fresh: "My contribution stems from a skeptical view of
religious belief that is extremely rare or non-existent in Indonesia. I
don't believe that we should tiptoe around our opposition to terrible
ideas even if they cloak themselves in the legitimacy of religion. This
starting point sets me apart from the liberal mainstream in Indonesia."
Describing himself as a liberal and atheist, Dhume distanced himself
from both the political left and right. To answer my question, he added:
"(w)hat is lacking in Indonesia is the space to be openly skeptical of
religion. Religious discourse is effectively a kind of protected
discourse. Now while I admire groups like JIL (Liberal Islam Network), I
also believe that you can't win the important arguments that need to be
won with fundamentalists simply by trading interpretations of
scripture."
The situation that both Taheri and Dhume perceptively analyzed has been
made possible by the systematic annihilation of the left in Indonesia
since 1965. The absence of the intellectual left has also been
significantly responsible for the lack of irreligious criticism of
religious orthodoxy and other violent-inclined vigilantes in the name of
a religion.
The writer is a senior lecturer in the Indonesian Program, the University of Melbourne, Australia. He can be reached at arielh@unimelb.edu.au
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2008/06/07/islamist-parties-try-be-less-islamist.html
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