Perda Syari’ah Bukanlah Syari’ah

4 Januari 2013

Dalam pernyataannya terkait dengan Perda larangan ngangkang atau phang dan pheng (bahasa Aceh red)  bagi perempuan yang dibonceng di atas sepeda motor, Sekretaris daerah Kota Lhokseumawe, Dasni Yuzar, menyatakan bahwa peraturan tersebut merupakan bagian untuk menegakkan syari’at Islam secara kaffah terutama di Kota Lhokseumawe.

Secara implisit pernyataan Dasni Yuzar merepresentasikan pandangan yang memahami bahwa perda syari’ah yang berlaku di daerah otonom seperti Aceh bersifat sakral. Sakralitas ini ditopang oleh teks-teks suci dalam agama Islam.

Namun menurut Ketua Pengurus Cabang Istimewa NU Amerika-Kanada, Akhmad Sahal, perda syariah bukanlah syariah. Perda syariah sama sebagaimana perda-perda lain. Yang dihasilkan oleh lembaga legislatif.

“Perda syariah adalah perda, yang sebagaimana perda-perda lain, bisa diperbaiki, diganti, atau bahkan dihapus sama sekali. Dengan kata lain, perda syariah adalah aturan buatan sekumpulan manusia yang duduk di parlemen. Dan proses politik di lembaga itu, kita tahu, seringkali diwarnai oleh kompromi kepentingan dan tawar menawar politik di antara mereka. Oleh karena itu, mendukung perda syari’ah tidak serta merta identik dengan menegakkan syariah. Dan menentangnya tidak lantas berarti menentang syariah” ungkap Akhmad Sahal di Akun Facebooknya.

Senada dengan hal itu, Peneliti Ma’arif Institute, Ahmad Najib Burhani, menyatakan bahwa perda syari’ah sangat mungkin didesakralisasi. Karena terkadang dalam perda syari’ah tidak mencerminkan nilai-nilai Islam sama sekali. [Mh]

http://www.lazuardibirru.org/berita/news/perda-syariah-bukanlah-syariah/

Aceh Man Stands By Lawsuit Against Loud Mosque Speakers

Jakarta Globe | February 22, 2013

A 75-year-old man in Aceh has filed a controversial lawsuit against local religious officials alleging that the noise from a nearby mosque’s six loudspeakers has negatively impacted his life.

Sayed Hassan originally filed the lawsuit against the Al Muchlisin mosque, the Aceh Religious Affairs office, Ulema Consultative Assembly (MPU) Aceh, Islamic Sharia Agency, and the Gampong Jawa village chief in December of 2012, according to Tempo.co.

Sayed claimed that the Al Muchlisin mosque, which is located 100 meters from his home in Gampong Jawa village, Banda Aceh, began broadcasting sermons from Baiturrahman radio twenty minutes before morning and evening prayers.

He reportedly asked the Imam to turn the volume down, but he refused.

Sayed responded with the lawsuit.

Hundreds of residents in Gampong Jawa were outraged after the matter made it to the Banda Aceh district court on Feb. 11. They demanded Sayed apologize for filing the suit and withdraw his claim.

Sayed told the local news portal Aceh.Tribunnews.com that he was sorry and would withdraw his case.

“I’m sorry for my mistake,” he wrote. “If I repeat it, I agree to be ousted from this village.”

But on Thursday, he told Tempo.co that villagers forced him to issue the statement. He had no plans to withdraw the lawsuit. The mosque, he said, continued to broadcast loud sermons at 4:30 a.m.

“This problem has not been solved,” he told Tempo.co on Thursday.

Banda Aceh’s deputy mayor said Sayed had no basis for filing the lawsuit. The man’s house, he said, is too far to be impacted by the loudspeakers.

“This is the first such case in Aceh and it is strange because the house of the plaintiff is located far from the mosque,” Deputy Mayor Illiza Sa’aduddin Djamal said.

http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/home/aceh-man-stands-by-lawsuit-against-loud-mosque-speakers/573384


Indonesian Wins Rare Victory Against Noisy Mosque February 25, 2013

Acehnese Sayed Hasan reads an Islamic book at his house in Banda Aceh on February 25, 2013. Hasan said on February 25 he had won a rare victory against a noisy mosque, despite being forced to withdraw legal action after an angry mob threatened to kill him. Complaints against the loud speakers issuing the call to prayer have been met with extreme opposition in Indonesia, the world's biggest Muslim-majority nation that is home to about 800,000 mosques. (AFP Photo/Chaideer Mahyuddin)

Banda Aceh. An elderly Indonesian said Monday he had won a rare victory against a noisy mosque, despite being forced to withdraw legal action after an angry mob threatened to kill him.

Complaints against the loud speakers issuing the call to prayer have been met with extreme opposition in Indonesia, the world’s biggest Muslim-majority nation that is home to about 800,000 mosques.

And when Sayed Hasan, 75, filed a lawsuit in December in the city of Banda Aceh, in which he complained of being disturbed by lengthy recordings of Koranic verses, it was met with strong protests from the community.

But Hasan, a Muslim, said despite being taken to see the deputy mayor and Muslim leaders, and then being escorted to the court where he was forced to withdraw his legal suit, he had ultimately won a rare victory.

“I was forced to withdraw my lawsuit as an angry mob threatened to kill me,” he said. “But after I dropped my case, the volume was significantly turned down by about half.”

A local Muslim leader said the imam had decided to reduce the noise.

City dwellers in Indonesia are often woken up before dawn by intermingling calls to prayer from three or four nearby mosques. Many also blare Koranic verses or broadcast day-long events through loudspeakers.

Ninety percent of Indonesia’s 240 million citizens are Muslim. While most practice a moderate form, Aceh province has implemented Sharia law, which is enforced by special Islamic police.

Agence France-Presse

http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/editorschoice/indonesian-wins-rare-victory-against-noisy-mosque/573911

Special Report: Indonesia - Exchanging Pluralism For An Islamist State

June 9, 2006

Special Report: Indonesia - Exchanging Pluralism For An Islamist State

We have reported extensively on the situation in Indonesia since we started last August, and one message has been clear: Indonesia is marching inexorably into Islamic extremism. A full list of all our articles on Indonesia (more than 94) can be found by clicking HERE.
Last year, attacks upon Christians escalated, with defenseless Christian schoolgirls being beheaded, shot and attacked with machetes in Central Sulawesi, a resurgence of a sectarian conflict which had occurred between 2001 and 2002, in which 1,000 people died.
The Rise of Militant Groups
The Sulawesi conflicts had been part of a wider war in adjacent islands of the archipelago, the Moluccan War. This had been initiated by Umar Jaffar Thalib (pictured), and his Islamist paramilitaries, the Lashkar Jihad, in 1999. By the time the war had ended in 2002, 9,000 people, mostly Christians, had been killed.
Thalib claimed to have met Osama bin Laden in Pakistan. He had fought in Afghanistan in the 1980s, where he became radicalized. Upon his return to Indonesia in the 1990s, he set up networks of Islamic boarding schools, called pesantren. In 2001, Thalib had been arrested for setting up an unofficial Islamic court, where he had sentenced a rapist to be stoned to death.
During the Moluccan conflict, Muslims loyal to Lashkar Jihad forcibly "converted" 3,900 Christians to become Muslims against their will. The majority of these, including women and the elderly, were forcibly circumcised.
Thalib, who is of Yemeni descent, was tried in January 2003 for sowing religious hatred, but was acquitted. Lashkar Jihad was officially disbanded in 2003.
Some sources claim Lashkar Jihad was set up with the backing of several mainstream politicians. For nearly 30 years previously, the dictator Suharto had ruled Indonesia, until he was deposed in 1998. He had taken over from Sukarno in 1967, the first president, who had ruled Indonesia from its official beginnings in 1950. Suharto was corrupt, but when in power he had kept Islamist militancy under strict control.
When Suharto was deposed, the tide of militant Islam ebbed more strongly, leading to the formation of Lashkar Jihad in 1998 and also the Front Pembela Islam (FPI) or Islamic Defenders' Front.
Founded in August 1998 by Middle Eastern born and Saudi-educated Habib Rizieq Shihab (aka Muhammad Rizieq), FPI has violently attacked Christians, and was involved in February in violent anti-cartoon protests, including attacks against the US Embassy on February 19 this year (pictured, below right), even though the United States mainstream press never reproduced the controversial Mohammed cartoons.
Following the tsunami disaster of 24 December 2004, FPI members descended onto Banda Aceh, the most severely affected area, and began to threaten foreign aid workers, accusing them of wishing to "convert" local Muslims to Christianity. According to the Jamestown Foundation, 1,000 members of FPI were in the disaster-struck region by the end of January. They had promised to mobilize 5,000.
The FPI led an anti-American campaign in 2001,which involved threatening businesses. This was done as a reaction to the US involvement in Afghanistan. The group threatened to remove all US influence from Indonesia, but the threat was never realized.
FPI regularly smash up venues they deem to be un-Islamic, such as pool halls, massage parlours and bars. Though these activities are illegal, FPI have long enjoyed a virtual immunity from actions from the notoriously corrupt Indonesian police.
On February 25 we reported that the police began to respond to FPI's threats of violence. In Bandung, the group had been threatening foreigners staying at the Holiday Inn hotel. They were interrogating people about their views on the Danish cartoons, and telling those who did not object that they had to leave the country. The group was acting in conjunction with the leader of the Anti-Apostasy Movement, a group they work with when closing down churches. In all, 27 people were arrested.
Recently, the US magazine Playboy began to produce an Indonesian edition in Jakarta. The offices of the publishers in Jakarta were attacked by 300 members of the FPI on April 12, even though the edition had no nudes. The group smashed windows, and damaged the gate and door of the building. They clashed with police, and two police officers were injured, but as per usual, no members of FPI were arrested. The magazine's editorial staff had to move to a secret location.
The Yemeni leader of FPI, Habib Rizieq Shihab (aka Muhammad Rizieq) was once punished by the state. The Middle-East-born and Saudi-educated scholar was taken to court in 2003, charged with inciting followers to make raids on foreign establishments. He served his seven month jail term at Salemba Penitentiary in Central Jakarta, being released on November 19, 2003. Now, FPI is active in 22 of Indonesia's provinces. It is said to gain much of its income from extortion.
What is perhaps pertinent to note here is the extent of foreign influences which are present within both FPI and Lashkar Jihad. Umar Jaffar Thalib of the latter group is of Yemeni descent, and many of the top leaders of FPI are also Arabic. Whereas Indonesia's strain of Islam under Sukarno and Suharto was renowned for its "moderate" nature, and its tolerance of other groups, the brand of Islam promoted by these fanatics, with Wahhabist influences, is becoming increasingly prevalent.
And instead of being ostracized or punished, the FPI has been brought in as consultants to enact Islamist bylaws by municipal councils in Indonesia. Even though the group is openly violent, and has contempt for Indonesia's constitution, or Pancasila, which advocates pluralism.
Introduction of Islamist Laws

One of the most significant factors in creating the current climate of Islamification was not a legal decision, but a religious one. A fatwa was issued by the MUI, the Indonesian Ulemas Council, on 27 July 2005, during its Seventh National Conference in Jakarta.
The fatwa, containing 11 decrees, banned inter-faith marriage, secularism, pluralism and liberal Islamic movements. It prohibited interfaith prayers unless these were led by Muslims and said that children who were of a different religion to their Muslim parents could not receive inheritance.
It issued a further prohibition, which declared that the Muslim sect known as Ahmadiyah (Ahmadi or Ahmadiyya) was an unlawful, "illegitimate" religion.
The consequences of this fatwa was devastating for the Ahmadiyah community, who number about 200,000 in Indonesia. Following the announcement, members of the sect were attacked in their communities, with mosques destroyed. We reported that on September 20 at Sukadana in West Java, a mob of 1,000 people attacked the local Ahmadiyyah community, damaging more than 70 homes and six mosques.
The anti-liberalism of the fatwa caused a progressive and moderate group, the Islamic Liberal Network to receive numerous death threats.
But national legislation has not helped the situation. Earlier in September, three Christian women from Indramayu, West Java, were charged under the nation's 2002 Child Protection Act, accused of trying to convert Muslim children. Their trial on September 1 had been brought by the MUI, because the three had invited Muslim children to come to an activity day, part of a "Happy Weekend" event. The women were sentenced to three years jail, even though they claimed they had not tried to convert the children. Their appeal in January failed and they remain in jail.
The situation which is leading to the current crisis became amplified when local city councils introduced Islamist bylaws. We first reported on these laws on March 12, at the same time as Islamist attacks upon Christians in Sulawesi began again with renewed vigor.
The city of Tangerang, outside Jakarta had introduced a new set of by-laws, which were ostensibly to outlaw gambling, drinking and prostitution. As a result of these laws, any woman who was found alone at night would be charged with prostitution.
One pregnant housewife, Lilis Lindawati (pictured, right), was waiting for a bus after staying late at work when she became arrested and thrown into jail. She was charged with being a prostitute the next morning. The judge asked her to open her handbag, and lipstick fell out. Judge Sinurat used this possession of make-up to decide that she was a prostitute. He fined her $40, which she was unable to pay, and consequently spent three days in jail. She is now prosecuting the mayor of Tangerang, Wahidin Halim, who introduced the law, for defamation and wrongful arrest.
At the same time as the introduction of Muslim morality-based bylaws, came the first protests against a new bill presented to the Indonesian parliament, called misleadingly the "Anti-Pornography Bill". This bill intends to address far more than pornography, which can be proibited under existing Criminal Code. For example, styles of dress which are "un-Islamic" and reveal areas of flesh can invoke a maximum jail term of 10 years and a 2 billion rupiah ($200,000) fine. As such, it would destroy the tourist industry of many islands, such as Bali, and neighbouring Lombok.
The bill's clauses about areas of exposed flesh, such as highs, hips, the navel and breasts, would also attack indigenous cultures, such as the Hindus of Bali whose saris often expose the navel, and the native cultures of West Papua, who are still wearing costumes from the stone age. Bali has become so enraged by the terms of the bill that is threatening to secede from Indonesia if the bill is passed.
Furthermore, the bill would make kissing on the mouth in public illegal. The proposed fine for such a crime would be a sentence of five years in jail, or a fine of 250,000 rupiah, equivalent to $27,000 US. For "erotic dancing", the same punishments would apply. And anyone organising such a display would be subjected to 10 years' jail, or a fine of 1 billion rupiahs ($100,000).
The bill's strongest supporters are the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), the MUI and Hizb ut-Tahrir, with other groups such as the Anti-Apostasy Movement.
Its strongest detractors are Hindus, Buddhists, Christians and women's groups, including Fatayat, the women's wing of the second largest Muslim group in Indonesia, the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). NU has a membership of 30 million Muslims.
But the rise of the anti-pornography bill has seen the rise of Islamic by-laws. A former member of Fatyat called Masruchah, now secretary general of the Indonesian Women's Coalition for Justice and Democracy states: "The phenomena of the anti-pornography bill started with the appearance of by-laws in some of the regions. Although not explicitly packaged as anti-pornography, they have put in place of anti-prostitution laws, morality laws and even Islamic Sharia laws. All these laws attempt to force women back into their homes. I know of at least 27 regional by-laws that are similar, though not exactly the same as the anti-pornography law."
The bylaws being introduced have been criticised as unconstitutional, as we reported on April 20: In South Sulawesi, several administrative regions make it compulsory for female civil servants to wear Islamic dress. All government employees there must be able to read and write Arabic.
Mochtar Pabotinggi, a researcher from the Indonesian Institute of Sciences agreed that the bylaws favoured Muslims above those of other religious beliefs, and ran counter to Indonesia's Constitution, written up in 1945. He said: "In a democracy, no majority group can dominate others."
"We have to respect other people who have different religions and not push them to do what Islam teaches. For instance, we cannot tell every woman who lives in Aceh to wear Muslim attire," he stated.
"Our Constitution appreciates pluralism as an Indonesian way of life. Administrations have to make bylaws that do not contradict the Constitution," Mochtar said. "We cannot utilize two systems of law to regulate a society. The bylaws have the potential to endanger the country's unity since they ignore the essence of pluralism."
The "constitution" is called the Pancasila, and as we reported on May 4: In Depok, which like Tangerang is another satellite town of Jakarta, the proposed institution of Islamic bylaws was drawn up with the violent extremist group the Front Pembela Islam or "Islamic Defenders' Front". [The other group which took part in consultations is the Indonesian Ulemas Council (MUI).]
In Aceh, the strict Sharia rules proposed for Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam district will force all non-Muslims to be ruled by Sharia, even if their "crimes" such as adultery are not illegal under secular law. Unusually for local rulings, the order for non-Muslims to be treated here under Sharia was made by state secretary Yusril Ihza Mahendra of the Indonesian government.
Syafi'i Anwar, who is the executive director of the International Centre for Islam and Pluralism (ICIP) said: The growing efforts to implement sharia are really part of the gradual "sharia-ization" in the country. After Aceh which officially adopted sharia under the special Autonomy Law, many regions have followed suit. Initially, only a few regions such as Cianjur, Tasikmalaya, Padang and Bulukumba introduced this bylaw. In 2005, 13 regencies demanded sharia and up to now, 18 regions have already or are about to adopt it."
"Some of the regencies have even adopted sharia in a way that discriminates against minority groups. For instance, the Padang municipal administration issued a bylaw requiring all schoolgirls, regardless of their religion, to wear the jilbab (Muslim headscarf). The bylaw is unacceptable because it is not in line with pluralism which the Constitution recognizes."
"The move to impose sharia is against the Constitution. Indeed, Indonesia is predominantly a Muslim country, but not an Islamic state. Our Constitution is not based on sharia but the state ideology of Pancasila. Pancasila is a kalimatun sawa, a common platform of Indonesian society."
Anwar stated that there are 400 ethnic groups in the archipelago of Indonesia, located on 17,000 different islands. Article 29 of Indonesia's constitution guarantees freedom of religion.
About 12% of people in Indonesia are not Muslim, and it is an abuse of their rights, as well as a breach of the terms of Indonesia's constitution, to force Islamism upon non-Muslims.
By allowing itself to be led by groups of such blatant criminality such as the FPI, whose leaders are not even Indonesian but come from the Middle East, the Indonesian government is allowing a form of "islamification" to happen than is being controlled by foreigners and extremists, rather than by the will of the population.
The Corruption Of Politics
On March 10 we reported that hardline Islamist groups had been pressuring the government of Indonesia to denounce the Ahmadiyyah sect. As a result, Indonesia's Religious Affairs Minister Maftuh Basyuni responded by announcing that the Ahmadiyyah should renounce their claims to be Muslim, and should declare themselves as a new religion.

We discussed on May 5 the views of Kyai Haji Abdurrahman Wahid (pictured) a genuine Muslim moderate, who was President of Indonesia between 1999, following Suharto's demise, and July 2001. Between 1984 and 1999 he had been the leader of the moderate Nadhlatul Ulama (NU).
Wahid, also known by his nickname of Gus Dur, has recently been arguing strongly against the move away from pluralism to Islamist monotheism. And for his pains, he and his followers have been vilified.

The links which follow, marked jp* are derived from the Jakarta Post, but cannot be accessed immediately, as they are archived, and require free registration to be retrieved.
Gus Dur is in no doubt that the Front Pembela Islam (FPI) are responsible for a climate of lawlessness and militant Islam, threatening Indonesia. At a rally on Tuesday May 23, Gus Dur himself was forced off a stage by members of FPI at a rally at Purwakarta in West Java. The FPI mob attacked him for his opposition to the anti-pornography bill. Habib Riziq, head of FPI said that Gus Dur's appearance in Purwakarta had "hurt the feelings of every Muslim." He refuses to apologise for the assault, and claims his group will continue to push for the implementation of the anti-pornography bill, and demands that police support the FPI.
On Friday, May 26 (jp*), hundreds of his supporters demonstrated to demand the disbandment of the FPI. They demonstrated in Jakarta at the National Police Headquarters, and also at the base of the FPI in Slipi, central Jakarta.
At the Jakarta National Police HQ, the supporters included members of the Garda Bangsa a paramilitary group allied to the National Awakening Party, as well as Christian youth organisation members, and the paramilitary force of Nadhlatul Ulama (NU) called Banser. They were united under the banner of the Alliance for an Antiviolent Society.
The Garda Bangsa leader, Eman Hendarman, said: "The FPI have slandered Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur), who is our leader, a former president, a national unity symbol and our imam. Their actions cannot be tolerated."
Eman continued: "We demand the police enforce the law. Violent organizations that wage terror and criminal acts have to be stopped. We didn't notify Gus Dur about this protest. He would have objected to this because he is a man of peace and wouldn't approve of any actions that could incite violence."
Garda Bangsa members also demonstrated on the same day (Friday) in East Java, in the town of Jember. There, hundreds of FPI supporters clashed with Garda Bangsa members, though no-one was seriously hurt.
The deputy chairman of NU, condemning FPI, has told the Jakarta Post: "Violent acts should not be tolerated. They do not represent Muslims as they claim to do."
The events of Friday May 26 became overshadowed by a tumultous event the following day, the earthquake in Yoghyakarta, which claimed more than 4,000 lives.
Some of the FPI have been dealt with recently. On Monday May 22 (jp*), the head of the local FPI at Bekasi in West Java was arrested, along with 20 of his followers. Abdul Qodir and his group were accused of smashing up several cafes and alleged sites of prostitution in Bekasi city that weekend.
About 60 members of the FPI had gone on the rampage in the suburb of Pondok Gede, armed with sticks, after attending a mass rally in Jakarta in support of the anti-pornography bill, organised by FPI and the MUI, which we reported upon.
A police spokesman ensured that his force did not appear too partisan. They announced that the 21 FPI members would be charged with destroying property, and that Abdul Qodir would be charged with incitement. However, he also announced that the cafe-owners would be charged with illegal sale of alcoholic drinks.
On the day of the pro-Gus Dur rallies, the Bekasi FPI (jp*) membership demanded the release of the 21 activists from police custody. They claimed in a written statement that they had only acted upon requests from the community. However, the following day saw the police resisting the FPI requests, and insisting on keeping its suspects in custody.
There have been plans to attempt to use Indonesia's laws and constitution to quell the mushrooming of Islamist by-laws in Indonesia. On Monday, May 22 (jp*), women's rights activists were reported to be campaigning for support for an attempt to demand a Supreme Court review of 26 shariah-based bylaws enacted in various regencies and municipalities.
As well as contravening the 1945 constitution, guaranteeing equal rights for men and women, and violate international accords to shich Indonesia has signed up. These include the 2005 International Convention on Civil and Political Rights and the 1984 law on women.
Masruchah, whom we described above, pointed to discrepancies within some by-laws: "In some regencies in South Sulawesi province, the bylaws require women to wear Muslim clothes but they do not prescribe the same thing for men. The bylaws curtail women's rights to move and act. In the West Java regency of Cianjur, women are seen as 'good women' only if they wear Muslim clothes."
The leader of the Jakarta branch of Legal Aid Foundation for Women (LBH-APIK), Ratna Batara Munti, notes the inequality of laws across regions, and calls for a nationwide movement to oppose discrimination. She states that dress laws discriminate against women and other laws discriminate against human rights. "In Palembang city (in South Sumatra), being a homosexual is punishable by jail terms and hefty fines," she said, adding: "It is the right of every person to determine his or her sexual orientation." The Palembang law does not condemn only homosexual acts, but the very state of "being" homosexual.
Tangerang's rulings which state that women alone outside at night without a male chaperone are condemned as prostitutes are already under examination by lawmakers. The Coalition to Oppose Discriminatory Local Ordinances filed a request for a judicial review of this ordinance at the Supreme Court.
A recent article from Asia News states that some scholars are now claiming that if Indonesia's government does not step in to act now, Indonesia will become an Islamist state, a move which was never intended when it was founded.
Muhammad Husein, the executive director of the Fahmina Institute in Cirebon, has claimed (jp*) that the MUI's fatwas from July 2005 are tarnishing Islam's reputation. He said: "Despite their non-binding nature, the fatwa are in line with the emergence of hard-line groups who fight for their political interests by abusing Islam."
Ahmad Suaedy, director of the Wahid Institute, set up by Gus Dur, said: "The hard-liners are using these edicts to legitimize their violent acts, while MUI has perversely used this violence to justify its fatwa. The FPI and MMI are taking advantage of people's religious illiteracy to make trouble."
The chairman of NU or Nahdlatul Ulama, Haysim Muzadi, said this week in an interview (jp*) that his group opposed the "formalisation" of Islam in the nation.
He said: "The public is skeptical about sharia. Even upon hearing the word sharia people have negative preconceptions. Islam should be understood in substance, not in rigid interpretation of the scripture, and therefore it should not be formalized as the common principle in multireligious and multiethnic Indonesia."
"For example, the Tangerang mayor's anti-prostitution ordinance. What's the point of adopting it? No religion permits prostitution. Besides, the crime is dealt with in the Criminal Code, so why not enforce the existing laws instead of making a new bylaw? If the bylaw is based on Islamic values, it creates problems with citizens of other faiths."
Last week, the President of Indonesia, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (pictured right), finally emerged from his ivory tower to condemn the attempts to shift Indonesia's society away from the concept of the Pancasila. Speaking at a ceremony (jp*) to commemorate the founding of the Pancasila, he reminded his audience of the diversity of Indonesia's inhabitants, belonging to different faiths and cultural traditions.
Yudhoyono said: "Let us make Pancasila the basis for reform. In this period of transition, many of us tend to create new realities and directions but abandon the old values, which should become part of our identity and be used as a tool for unity."
"We should end the debate on alternatives to the Pancasila as our ideology. We should keep on with efforts to increase the people's welfare and to uphold justice based on the ideology that we have."
Though implicitly stating that diversity, rather than Islamism, was the key to Indonesian harmony and stability, Yudhoyono stopped short of making an outright condemnation of the current moves to turn Indonesia into an Islamist state.
Yesterday, June 8 (jp*), the government issued an ultimatum to the Islamist hardline groups to abide by the law.
The Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal and Security Affairs, Widodo Adi Sutjipto, said: "Acts promoting anarchy, threats of terror, or moves to take the law into one's own hands are classified as crimes, which will be processed under the country's existing laws....We have never tolerated any wrongdoing, regardless of who or what groups are implicated in it. Our (the government's) stance is clear, that we must enforce the supremacy of the law and equality before the law."
This statement should have been made, and acted upon, a year ago. It is possible that with current trends in Indonesia, such comments are too little, and too late.

Posted by Giraldus Cambrensis at June 9, 2006 4:29 PM

Retrieved from: http://web.archive.org/web/20070715171158/http://www.westernresistance.com/blog/archives/002313.html

Kritik buku "Islam Tanpa Syariat: Menggali Universalitas Tradisi"

Minggu, 27 Maret 2011

 Oleh: Ust. Arief B. Iskandar


Pengantar

Tahun ini dunia perbukuan nasional 'diramaikan' oleh terbitnya sebuah buku berjudul, Islam Tanpa Syariat: Menggali Universalitas Tradisi. Buku yang diterbitkan oleh PT Grafindo yang bekerjasama dengan sejumlah LSM ini merupakan rangkuman hasil ceramah cendekiawan Inggris asal Pakistan bernama Ziauddin Sardar di berbagai tampat di Indonesia, yang kedatangannya disponsori oleh British Council.


Secara umum, buku ini ingin memberi gambaran, bahwa Islam yang ideal adalah 'Islam tanpa syariat'. Menurut Sardar, kaum Muslim gagal melakukan ijtihad karena tiga "malapetaka metafisis". Pertama: pengkultusan syariat sebagai sesuatu yang suci. Kedua: lenyapnya semangat ijtihad di kalangan Muslim. Ketiga: penyamaan Islam dengan negara. (Sardar, 2005: 15).

Kaum Muslim, kata Sardar, seharusnya menyadari bahwa hukum dan yurisprudensi yang selama ini menjadi rujukan utama dibangun dalam konteks sosial masa lalu yang tidak selalu sesuai dengan kehidupan masyarakat kontemporer. Kaum Muslim perlu melakukan rekonstruksi hukum dan etika dari sumber aslinya, yaitu dari konsep-konsep dan nilai-nilai asasi yang melekat di dalam al-Quran sebagai spirit pembaruan Islam (Sardar, 2005: 15).

Salah satu sebab utama kegagalan dalam menjawab panggilan ijtihad, kata Sardar, adalah konteks dari Kitab Suci kita yang tidak sesuai dengan kehidupan sekarang. Konteks sosial al-Quran dan as-Sunnah Nabi Muhammad saw. membeku dalam sejarah. Yang bisa kita lakukan hanyalah menafsirkan teks. (Sardar, 2005: 17).

Selanjutnya dia mengatakan, bahwa mayoritas Muslim menempatkan syariat Islam pada posisi suci, padahal tidak ada satu pun aspek syariah yang sakral. Menurutnya, hanya al-Quran yang suci; selainnya, termasuk syariah, jauh dari suci; syariah adalah produk hukum ciptaan manusia. (Sardar, 2005: 18).

Dalam buku ini, Sardar banyak menyebut masalah 'konteks' dalam aspek hukum. Biasanya ungkapan semacam ini dimaksudkan agar orang Islam harus meninggalkan teks suci al-Quran karena zaman dan tempat sudah berubah. Padahal, menurut Adian Husaini, para pemuja aliran "kontekstiyah" ini sebenarnya juga para pemuja "teks". Hanya saja, teks mereka bukan lagi al-Quran dan Sunnah atau kitab-kitab khazanah fikih Islam. Teks suci bagi mereka adalah semacam, "Universal Declaration of Human Right", "KUHP", "Declaration of Independen-nya Amerika", dan sebagainya. Mereka menolak teks yang sakral menuju teks yang profan. Karena itu, jika para penganut aliran "kontekstiyah" ini menuduh kaum Muslim dijajah "teks" al-Quran dan as-Sunnah, maka sebenarnya—tanpa sadar—mereka juga merupakan para pemuja teks bikinan manusia yang tidak suci dari godaan setan yang terkutuk. (Adian Husaini, Hidayatullah.com, 3/6/2005).

Tulisan berikut sekadar ingin mengajak kembali kita semua untuk merekonstruksi pemahaman kita atas Islam, yakni bahwa Islam yang ideal tetaplah Islam dengan syariah, bukan yang tanpa syariah.

Islam: Akidah dan Syariat

Sebagaimana dimaklumi, Islam terdiri dari akidah dan syariah. Al-Quran menggunakan kata al-îmân untuk akidah dan kata ‘amal ash-shâlih untuk syariah. Al-Quran telah menyatakan hal ini di banyak tempat, antara lain: surat al-Kahfi (18) ayat 107-108; surat al-Nahl (16) ayat 97; surat al-‘Ashr (103) ayat 3; dan surat al-Ahqaf (46) ayat 13. Kenyataan ini menunjukkan bahwa Islam merupakan satu-kesatuan utuh yang terdiri dari akidah dan syariah. Pemisahan keduanya akan menghilangkan jatidiri Islam.

Definisi Syariah

Secara etimologis, kata as-syarî’ah mempunyai konotasi masyra‘ah al-mâ’ (sumber air minum). (Ibn al-Manzhur, Lisân al-’Arab, I/175; Fayruz al-Abadi, al-Qâmûs al-Muhîth, I/6672; Ar-Razi, Mukhtâr as-Shihâh, hlm. 294).

Dalam istilah syariah, syarî‘ah berarti agama yang ditetapkan oleh Allah Swt. untuk hamba-hamba-Nya yang terdiri dari berbagai hukum dan ketentuan yang beragam (Al-Qurthubi, Al-Jâmi’ li Ahkâm al-Qur’ân, XVI/163). Karena itu, syariah dan agama mempunyai konotasi yang sama. (Ibn al-Manzhur, Op.cit., XI/631), yaitu berbagai ketentuan dan hukum yang ditetapkan oleh Allah Swt. bagi hamba-hamba-Nya.

Dalam pengertian syar‘i, para ulama ushul mendefinisikan syariah (syarî‘ah) sebagai perintah Asy-Syâri‘ (Pembuat hukum) yang berhubungan dengan perbuatan-perbuatan hamba dan berkaitan dengan iqtidhâ‘ (ketetapan), takhyîr (pilihan), atau wadh‘i (kondisi) (khithâb asy-Syâri‘ al-muta‘allaq bi af‘âl al-‘ibâd bi al-iqtidhâ‘ aw al-takhyîr, aw al-wadl‘i (An-Nabhani, Asy-Syaksiyyah al-Islâmiyyah, III/31. Lihat juga: Al-Amidi, Al-Ihkâm fî Ushûl al-Ahkâm; Al-Amidi, Ibid., I/70-71; Asy-Syaukani, Irsyâd al-Fuhûl, hlm. 7).

Dari definisi di atas, baik secara etimologis maupun terminologis syar‘î, tampak jelas bahwa ruang lingkup syariah adalah seluruh ajaran Islam; baik yang berkaitan dengan ubudiah, akhlak, makanan, pakaian, muamalat, maupun persanksian (An-Nabhani, Nizhâm al-Islâm, hlm. 74; An-Nabhani, Mafâhîm Hizb at-Tahrîr, hlm. 36).

Menolak Islam Tanpa Syariah

Meski realitas syariah sudah demikian jelas, sejumlah kalangan, khususnya kalangan Islam Liberal, langsung ataupun tidak langsung, sering melakukan 'desakralisasi syariah', bahkan menolak syariat Islam, khususnya ketika syariat Islam diformalkan dalam kehidupan kaum Muslim alias dilembagakan dalam negara. Sebagai dasar penolakannya, mereka antara lain merekomendasikan beberapa hal berikut:

1. Islam harus dipahami secara substantif, tidak boleh secara literalistik.

Pada faktanya, apa yang selama ini oleh kalangan Islam Liberal sering dianggap sebagai 'substansi' Islam tidak jarang hanya merupakan aspek 'literasi' Islam. Banyak dari mereka yang alih-alih berpikir substantifistik, yang terjadi, mereka tidak lebih sekadar berpikir 'literalistik'. Ketika Islam diartikan sekadar 'sikap pasrah', salat dimaknai sekadar 'doa', jihad ditafsirkan sekadar 'sungguh-sungguh', syariat dimaknai sekadar 'jalan', dst., yang terjadi sebetulnya adalah tafsir literal—bukan substansial—atas Islam. (Lihat: M. Husain Abdillah, Mafâhîm Islâmiyyah, II/6-12).

2. Islam harus dipahami secara kontekstual.

Memang, al-Quran dan as-Sunnah tidak hanya sekadar teks yang 'terasing'. Keduanya turun tidak terlepas dari konteks kehidupan manusia pada masanya. Karena itulah, dalam hal ini, kita mengenal apa yang disebut dengan asbâb an-nuzûl dan asbâb al-wurûd; meskipun tidak semua nash al-Quran dan as-Sunnah selalu dilatarbelakangi oleh asbâb an-nuzûl dan asbâb al-wurûd-nya. Apalagi, para ulama ushul telah sepakat, bahwa keputusan hukum yang terkandung dalam nash al-Quran dan as-Sunnah harus didasarkan pada keumuman ungkapannya, bukan kekhususan sebabnya. Karena itu, ada kaidah yang terkenal di kalangan para ulama ushul:

[اَلْعِبْرَةُ بِعُمُوْمِ اللَّفْظِ لاَ بِخُصُوْصِ السَّبَبِ]
"Ibrah (baca: hukum) itu bergantung pada keumuman ungkapan, bukan pada kekhususan sebabnya."

Lebih dari itu, kontekstualisasi Islam—yang intinya syariat Islam harus disesuaikan dengan konteks zamannya (dengan asumsi, zaman terus berubah)—sebagaimana yang dipahami kalangan Islam Liberal akan betabrakan dengan dua prinsip:
Pertama, Yang disebut dengan 'perubahan zaman' sebetulnya tidak lebih dari perubahan sarana/prasarana yang terkait dengan teknologi. Ketika orang menyebut zaman Nabi saw. adalah 'zaman unta' dan zaman sekarang disebut 'zaman kuda besi', itu sebetulnya hanya sekadar merujuk pada sarana/prasarana (teknologi). Manusianya sendiri, baik zaman dulu maupun zaman sekarang tidaklah berbeda; mereka sama-sama memiliki fitrah (hâjah 'udhawiyhah dan dan gharâ'iz) yang sama. Pada faktanya, syariat Islam lebih berkaitan dengan fitrah manusia ini (yang tidak pernah berubah dari dulu sampai sekarang) ketimbang dengan sarana/prasarana (teknologi) yang digunakan manusia.
Kedua, Syariat Islam lebih berfungsi sebagai social engineering ketimbang sekadar social control atau, lebih naif lagi, sebagai justifikasi perilaku sosial. Oleh karena itu, menurut An-Nabhani (2001), kepentingan terbesar Islam sepanjang sejarahnya adalah bagaimana mengkondisikan masyarakat dengan Islam, bukan malah menyesuaikan Islam dengan realitas yang ada. Apalagi dalam masyarakat modern saat ini, parameter akan sulit di dapat, karena opini menjadi dewa. Padahal, sebagaimana kata Hitler, yang dikutip Amien Rais (1987), opini massa bisa dengan mudah direkayasa melalui mesin propaganda.

3. Yang disebut syariat Islam adalah ‘nilai-nilai universal’ seperti kemanusian, keadilan, dsb.

Pada faktanya, yang dipandang sebagai 'nilai-nilai universal' seperti nilai 'kemanusiaan' atau 'keadilan' pada tataran praktis akan menemui jalan buntu. Bagaimana adil itu diciptakan, misalnya, ternyata tidak bisa berhenti pada dataran filosofis, namun harus turun ke dataran yuridis (hukum), bahkan pada beberapa hal harus turun lagi ke dataran aritmetis.

Di samping itu, syariat Islam, sebagaimana produk hukum manapun, tidak bisa 'diobyektivikasi'. Contoh kecil, dalam satu kasus yang sama seperti perkosaan, jika diberlakukan dua hukum yang berbeda, yang satu hukum rajam, sementara yang lain sekadar hukum penjara tiga bulan kurungan, manakah yang lebih adil? Jika hukuman kurungan tiga bulan dipandang lebih adil, adil bagi siapa? Apakah bagi pemerkosa, bagi yang diperkosa, atau bagi masyarakat? Apa parameternya? Siapa pula yang berhak menentukan adil-tidaknya hukum: manusia (yang serba terbatas dan sering dipengaruhi oleh kepentingan hawa nafsunya) ataukah Allah Yang Mahatahu, yang tidak memiliki kepentingan apapun terhadap manusia?

Walhasil, nilai-nilai keadilan dan kemanusiaan pun, mau tidak mau, bergantung pada persepsi ideologis manusianya, alias bersifat subyektif. Karena kita Muslim, tentu persepsi ideologis Islamlah—yang didasarkan pada al-Quran dan as-Sunnah—yang harus digunakan untuk mengukur nilai-nilai kemanusiaan dan keadilan tersebut; bukan persepsi yang bersumber dari idelogi Kapitalisme-sekular maupun Sosielisme-komunis.

4. Islam tidak perlu dilegal-formalkan, yang penting substansinya.

Secara jujur kita bisa mengatakan bahwa sebuah ideologi—entah Islam, Kapitalisme-sekular, ataupun Sosialisme komunis—tidak akan pernah bisa eksis sekiranya hanya ditegakkan substansinya saja, tidak pernah dilegal-formalkan atau terlembagakan dalam institusi negara. Bukankah Islam pernah diperhitungkan eksistensinya pada masa lalu justru melalui institusi Kekhilafahan selama hampir 13 abad? Bukankah Kapitalisme-sekular bisa diperhitungkan eksistensinya saat ini karena diformalkan di dalam institusi negara seperti Amerika dan Eropa? Bukankah pula Sosialisme-komunis diperhitungkan eksistensinya ketika terlembagakan dalam institusi negara seperti Uni Sovyet (sebelum bubar) atau Cina? Artinya, ideologi manapun, termasuk Islam, hanya akan menjadi ideologi utopia jika tidak pernah terlembagakan dalam negara.

Khatimah

Walhasil, Islam yang ideal tetaplah Islam dengan syariah, bukan Islam tanpa syariah. Bahkan, kita harus berani mengatakan, Islam yang tanpa syariah adalah Islam palsu alias bukan Islam! []

Daftar Pustaka

Ibn al-Manzhur, Lisân al-’Arab.
Al-Fayruz al-Abadi, Al-Qâmûs al-Muhîth.
Ar-Razi, Mukhtâr ash-Shihâh, Maktabah Lubnan, Beirut, 1996.
Al-Qurthubi, Al-Jâmi’ li Ahkâm al-Qur’ân, juz XVI.
An-Nabhani, Mafâhîm Hizb at-Tahrîr, Mansyurat Hizbut Tahrir, cet. VI, 2001.
M. Husain Abdillah, Mafâhîm Islâmiyyah, 1995.
Atha’ bin Khalil, Taysîr al-Wushûl ilâ al-Ushûl, Dar al-Ummah, Beirut, cet. IV, 2000.
Mahmud Syalthut, Islâm ‘Aqîdah wa Syarî‘ah, ed. III, Dar al-Qalam, 1966.
Imam asy-Syaukani, Irsyâd al-Fuhûl.
Imam al-Amidi, Al-Ihkâm fî Ushûl al-Ahkâm.
Taqiyyuddin an-Nahbani, Asy-Syakhshiyyah al-Islâmiyyah, jilid ke-3.
Ziauddin Sardar, Islam Tanpa Syariat: Menggali Universalitas Tradisi. Jakarta: PT Grafindo, 2005.

Retrieved from: http://putra-dayeuhluhur.blogspot.com/2011/03/kritik-buku-islam-tanpa-syariat.html 

Islam Tanpa Syariat versi Pemuda Muhammadiyah

Hidayatullah.com, Tuesday, 07 June 2005 00:50  
 
Muhammadiyah kini dipenuhi tokoh-tokoh beraliran "konteksiyah". Aliran ini berpendapat Al-Qur'an harus diseuaikan dengan zaman.  Baca Catatan Akhir Pekan (CAP) ke-102 Adian Husaini, MA
Sejak berdirinya tahun  1912, pendiri dan tokoh-tokoh Muhammadiyah mungkin tidak ada yang berpikir, bahwa suatu ketika, akan muncul dari  tubuh organisasi ini berbagai pemikiran yang meruntuhkan bangunan Islam. Tetapi, kenyataannya, saat ini tidaklah demikian. Begitu banyak ide-ide yang diluncurkan lembaga dan sebagian tokoh Muhammadiyah yang “aneh-aneh” dan tidak
masuk akal sehatnya kaum Muslim. Tidak jarang ide itu mengatasnamakan lembaga resmi Muhammadiyah maupun mencatut nama pendiri Muhammadiyah, KH Ahmad Dahlan, seolah-olah pendiri Muhammadiyah ini adalah tokoh pluralisme.
Hari Jumat (3 Juni 2005), seorang tokoh Muhammadiyah yang juga Ketua Dewan Direktur Center for Moderate Muslim (CMM), dr. Tarmizi Taher, menulis artikel di Harian Republika dengan judul “Memetik Nilai-nilai Pluralisme dari KH Ahmad Dahlan”. Penulis artikel ini tidak bisa membedakan antara “toleransi” dengan “pluralisme”, yang merupakan paham (isme) tertentu dalam melihat pluralitas agama. Paham ini diakui oleh kalangan agamawan merupakan paham yang destruktif terhadap semua agama, sehingga Vatikan secara resmi menolaknya pada tahun 2000. Tetapi, aneh dan ajaib, dari tubuh Muhammadiyah bisa muncul  dukungan terhadap paham pluralisme.
Kekeliruan Tarmizi tampak semakin jelas, ketika ia mengajak umat Islam untuk membuat tafsir al-Quran dalam bingkai pluralisme. Misalnya, QS 9:29, “Perangilah orang-orang yang tidak beriman kepada Allah”, menurut dia, akan berdampak buruk jika dipahami secara tekstual. Ayat ini, katanya, tidak berlaku universal, melainkan terikat dengan ruang dan waktu. Kondisi masyarakat Arab dimana ayat itu diturunkan, berada dalam suasana yang terpolarisasi dalam (1) kutub kaum beriman dan (2) kutub kaum tidak beriman.
Jika Tarmizi membaca kitab-kitab tafsir dan fiqih, maka akan didapati begitu banyak pembahasan tentang masalah ini, dan tidak perlu dikaitkan dengan paham pluralisme agama. Islam adalah agama yang sejak awal sadar akan perbedaan dan mengakui perbedaan. Meskipun demikian, ayat-ayat al-Quran penuh dengan penjelasan tentang kekeliruan agama kaum Yahudi dan Kristen. Ada kalanya redaksi al-Quran bernada keras adakalanya bernada lembut. Untuk orang-orang kafir seperti Abu Lahab, al-Quran menggunakan redaksi “Celakalah kedua tangan Abu Lahab.” Nabi Muhammad saw begitu banyak mengajarkan, kapan bersikap lembut dan kapan bersikap tegas terhadap kaum kafir. Terhadap kaum kafir Zimmi, Rasulullah saw berwasiat agar mereka diperlakukan dengan baik. Tetapi, terhadap kaum Yahudi yang berkhianat terhadap perjanjian Madinah, Rasulullah bersikap tegas, memerangi dan mengusir mereka.
Sayyidina Abubakar r.a. dikenal sebagai seorang yang sangat lembut hatinya. Tetapi, terhadap kaum pembangkang zakat, Sayyidina Abu Bakar tidak memberi ampun.
Adalah sangat disesalkan, jika tokoh seperti Tarmizi Taher membawa-bawa nama KH Ahmad Dahlan, dalam menyebarkan paham pluralisme, tanpa bisa membedakan yang mana kerukunan, dan mana pluralisme.
Akan tetapi, lebih dari gagasan pluralismenya Tarmizi Taher, ada yang ajaib lagi muncul dari organisasi Muhammadiyah, yang akan bermuktamar ke-45 bulan Juli 2005 nanti. Tahun ini,  Pemuda Muhammadiyah bekerjasama dengan PW NU Jawa Timur, Muslim Institute, British Council, dan PT Grafindo Khazanah Ilmu, menerbitkan sebuah buku berjudul “Islam Tanpa Syariat:  Menggali Universalitas Tradisi”. Buku ini merupakan rangkuman hasil ceramah cendekiawan Inggris bernama Ziauddin Sardar di berbagai tampat di Indonesia, yang kedatangannya disponsori oleh British Council.
Secara umum, gagasan Sardar yang dirangkum dalam buku ini, tidak jauh berbeda dengan gagasan para tokoh liberal, seperti Fazlur Rahman, Abdullah Ahmed Naim, Mohammed Arkoen, dan sebagainya. Tetapi, judul buku ini sendiri mengangkat tema “dekonstruksi  syariah” secara lebih ekstrim, sehingga memberi gambaran, bahwa Islam yang ideal adalah ‘Islam tanpa syariat’.
 
Sayangnya, buku ini tidak memberi definisi yang jelas, apakah yang dimaksud dengan syariat. Namun, pada bagian lain Sardar menyebutkan, bahwa syariat adalah sama dengan hukum Islam. Kata ini secara umum dipahami oleh kaum Muslim sebagai “hukum-hukum Islam”. Karena itu, Islam tanpa syariat, akan dipahami secara umum sebagai Islam tanpa ‘hukum-hukum Islam’.
Tokoh-tokoh Muhammadiyah dulu yang memperjuangkan diterapkannya Piagam Jakarta juga memperjuangkan tegaknya syariat  Islam di Indonesia, karena Piagam ini menyebutkan tujuh kata yang terkenal “Ketuhanan, dengan kewajiban menjalankan syariat Islam bagi pemeluk-pemeluknya.”
Menurut Sardar, kaum Muslim gagal melakukan ijtihad, karena tiga  “malapetaka metafisis”. Pertama, pengkultusan syariat sebagai sebagai sesuatu yang suci. Kedua, lenyapnya semangat ijtihad di kalangan muslim. Ketiga, penyamaan Islam dengan negara. 
Kaum Muslim, kata Sardar, seharusnya menyadari bahwa hukum dan jurisprudensi yang selama ini  menjadi rujukan utama, dibangun dalam konteks sosial masa lalu yang tidak selalu sesuai dengan kehidupan masyarakat kontemporer.
Kaum muslim perlu melakukan rekonstruksi hukum dan etika dari sumber aslinya yaitu dari konsep-konsep dan nilai-nilai asasi yang melekat di dalam al-Quran  sebagai spirit pembaharuan Islam.
Masih kata Sardar, salah satu sebab utama kegagalan dalam menjawab panggilan ijtihad adalah konteks dari Kitab Suci kita yang tidak sesuai dengan kehidupan sekarang.
Konteks sosial al-Quran dan as-Sunnah Nabi Muhammad membeku dalam sejarah. Yang bisa kita lakukan hanyalah menafsirkan teks.
Bahkan, katanya, kita pun tidak berani melakukan interpretasi karena interpretasi sebelumnya dianggap abadi. Interpretasi terhadap teks akan memiliki makna apabila konteksnya sesuai dengan konteks kekinian. Interpretasi teks yang tidak sezaman tidak memiliki arti dan siginifikansi apa pun. Secara konstan, penafsiran lama akan menyeret kita kembali ke masa silam, konteks yang sekian lama membeku dan lapuk dalam sejarah.
Selanjutnya dia katakan, bahwa mayoritas Muslim menempatkan syariat – hukum Islam – pada posisi suci. Padahal, tidak ada satupun aspek syariat yang sakral. Hanya al-Quran yang suci. Selainnya, termasuk syariat, jauh dari suci.
Syariat adalah produk hukum ciptaan manusia; usaha yang dilakukan manusia untuk memahami kehendak suci dari Tuhan dalam konteks sosial tertentu. Bagian terbesar syariat adalah fiqh, jurisprudensi Islam, yang tiada lain berisi pendapat hukum dari para fuqaha masa klasik.
Untuk lebih meyakinkan akan “ketidakberhargaan” fiqh, Sardar menyatakan, bahwa kompilasi fiqh sebagai produk hukum yang sistematis tidak dapat dilepaskan dari konteks politik Dinasti Abbasiyah, dimana sejarah Islam pada fase ekspansi. Yang harus diingat, formulasi Fiqh berkaitan erat dengan logika imperialisme pada masa itu. Demikianlah cuplikan pendapat Sardar tentang syariat dan fiqh.
Kita bisa menilai, betapa bias dan dangkalnya analisis Sardar, yang selama ini dikenal sebagai
cendekiawan dan futurolog yang kritis terhadap Barat. Tuduhan-tuduhan yang berkaitan dengan para ahli fiqh Islam terlalu berlebihan.
Kesimpulan-kesimpulan Sardar gegabah dan serampangan serta berlebihan. Hanya dengan mengambil contoh satu dua kasus hukum – seperti hukum murtad – dia lalu berkesimpulan bahwa syariat atau fiqh Islam dirumuskan terkait dengan aspek kepentingan politik.
Benarkah syariat Islam tidak suci, dan hanya merupakan produk hukum ciptaan manusia, seperti
tuduhan Sardar? Jelas pendapat ini sangat keliru. Jika kita mengakui kesucian al-Quran, maka hukum-hukum yang dicantumkan dalam al-Quran atau yang diajarkan oleh Rasulullah adalah suci juga, dan bukan karangan para ulama.
Hukum bahwa shalat adalah wajib, khamar adalah haram, zakat adalah wajib, babi haram, dan sebagainya, ialah hukum Allah, bukan karangan manusia. Para fuqaha di masa Nabi Muhammad saw, sampai abad ini, akan tetap berpendapat seperti itu. Tuduhan-tuduhan semacam ini adalah tuduhan yang keji; seolah-olah para ulama adalah para perekayasa pembuatan hukum Islam. 
Sardar banyak menyebut masalah konteks dalam aspek hukum. Namun, dia tidak memberikan definisi yang jelas, apa yang dimaksud dengan konteks. Biasanya ungkapan semacam ini dimaksudkan, agar orang Islam harus meninggalkan teks suci al-Quran, karena zaman
dan tempat sudah berubah. Hukum tergantung pada konteks, bukan pada teks.
Jilbab, kata mereka, misalnya, bukan pakaian yang menutup tubuh wanita kecuali muka dan telapak tangan, tetapi jilbab adalah “kepantasan umum”. Jika di pantai, yang pantas adalah mengenakan bikini, bukan kerudung. Di daerah pedalaman tertentu, “jilbab” adalah “koteka”. Di kolam renang,
“jilbab” adalah pakaian renang ala bikini. Dan sebagainya.
Pemikiran semacam ini – seperti seringkali kita bahas – adalah absurd dan fragmentatif. Para pemuja aliran “kontekstiyah” ini sebenarnya juga para pemuja “teks”. Hanya saja, teks mereka bukan lagi al-Quran dan Sunnah atau kitab-kitab khazanah fiqih Islam, tetapi teks suci bagi mereka adalah semacam “Universal Declaration of Human Right”, “KUHP”, “Declaration of
Independen-nya Amerika”, dan sebagainya. Mereka menolak teks ang satu menuju kepada teks yang lain.
Silakan dicermati, mereka akan selalu menyatakan, bahwa zaman kita sudah berubah, sekarang kita harus menganut demokrasi, pluralisme, hak asasi manusia, yang masing-masing juga mempunyai teks-teks yang mereka sucikan. Jika para penganut aliran kontekstiyah ini menuduh kaum Muslim dijajah “teks” al-Quran dan Sunnah, maka sebenarnya – tanpa sadar –  mereka sebenarnya juga merupakan para pemuja teks bikinan manusia yang tidak suci dari godaan setan yang terkutuk. Penganut aliran ‘kontekstiyah’ juga rajin menghujat para imam mazhab dan para ulama Islam,  seolah-olah para imam itulah yang membuat Islam mundur selama ratusan tahun. Na’uzhubillah.
Hukum Islam adalah salah satu aspek penting dalam peradaban Islam. Di bidang ini, kaum Muslim telah membuktikan keunggulannya, sehingga selama ratusan tahun hukum Islam diterapkan dan hidup dalam tradisi ilmiah Islam. Bahkan, sampai saat ini pun, hukum Islam tetap hidup, meskipun secara terbatas. Cakupan hukum Islam jauh lebih luas daripada hukum yang dipahami di Barat. Hukum Islam mencakup aspek ibadah, sosial, politik, dan sebagainya. Hukum Islam mengatur hubungan individu dengan dirinya sendiri, dengan Tuhannya, dengan manusia, bahkan dengan alam semesta. 
Karakterisik hukum Islam seperti ini sangat khas Islam dan jauh berbeda dengan hukum dalam pengertian di Barat. Dalam konsep hukum Islam, bunuh diri bukan hak, tetapi sebuah dosa. Seorang dilarang meminum khamr, meskipun hanya seteguk dan dilakukan di dalam kamar, tanpa merugikan orang lain. Zina tetap haram, meskipun dilakukan atas dasar suka sama suka.
Jika Pemuda Muhammadiyah berani mempromosikan gagasan “Islam tanpa Syariat”, maka seharusnya mereka konsisten dengan gagasannya itu. Mereka harusnya meninggalkan syariat Islam secara total. Mereka tidak perlu menikah secara Islam, tidak perlu haji ke Mekkah, dan tidak perlu dimakamkan secara Islam.
Mereka harusnya membuat wasiat buat keluarga dan umat Islam, jika mereka meninggal dunia nanti, tidak perlu jenazah mereka diurus sesuai dengan  syariat Islam. Jenazah mereka tidak perlu disalatkan, dikafani, atau dimakamkan secara syariat Islam. Cukup,  mayat mereka  nanti dibuang  ke laut,  dibakar, atau dijadikan umpan binatang buas di tengah hutan belantara. Kebetulan,
tanah Jawa ini sudah semakin sempit buat kuburan. Gagasan “Islam tanpa syariat” memang sangat cocok dengan program efisiensi  tanah pekuburan yang sedang digalakkan di Jakarta, khususnya. Wallahu a’lam. (Jakarta, 3 Juni 2005/Hidayatullah.com).

Retrieved from: http://old.hidayatullah.com/kolom/adian-husaini/1946-islam-tanpa-syariat-versi-pemuda-muhammadiyah

Political 'fatwa' for presidential election is not legally binding

The Jakarta Post, Jakarta | Opinion | Wed, June 09 2004, 9:25 AM

Ahmad Najib Burhani, Jakarta

On Thursday, 3 June, several influential ulema of the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), the country's largest Muslim organization, in East Java issued a fatwa (edict) ordering its members to vote against any woman candidate as president. In February 2004, an extended plenary meeting or mini tanwir (the second highest assembly) of the Muhammadiyah -- the country's second largest Muslim organization -- in Yogyakarta also issued a fatwa that supported Amien Rais, a former chairman of the Muhammadiyah, as a presidential candidate.

A fatwa is an opinion on a point of law. It is usually related to civil and religious matters, such as the dates of the fasting month or Ramadhan, and interreligious marriage. In the political sphere, a fatwa may cause friction, however.

As a legal opinion, the fatwa is regarded as binding. While, in an Indonesian political context, such as the presidential election, issuing an edict to support a certain candidate is controversial and debatable. In this regard, some people believe that such an edict misuses religion for political purposes.

What role do ulema have in politics? Is a fatwa a kind of divine opinion? Why have some clerics issued fatwa for the presidential election?

Ira M. Lapidus defines ulema as ""a category of people ... permeating the whole of society ... they play a crucial role in the process through which social communication occurs and, thus, in the integration of society as a working whole"" (1984).

According to Clifford Geertz, ulema are cultural brokers, ""to stand guard over the crucial junctures of synapses of relationships which connect the local system with the larger whole..."" (1960).

In Java, and in many parts of Indonesia, ulema are brokers between local culture and global cultures. Their function is guiding and giving direction to the umat (followers of Islam) on how they should deal with foreign cultures. As a logic extension of their role as brokers, they may become involved in other aspects of life, including politics. In this case, ulema often cast themselves as political brokers.

There is nothing wrong with being a political broker, it is a worthy and essential role. However, the participation of ulema in the political hurly-burly often creates the view or assumption that ulema are critical people, particularly if they collaborate with a certain party. In this context, they may lend authenticity to a politician's candidacy. Thus, their duty is merely to provide political legitimization. The issuance of an edict becomes a way in which they can support a certain political camp. In this case, religion is abused for non-religious ends.

The Muhammadiyah tanwir (in Makassar, 2003), provided good guidance for its members. One of the decisions of the tanwir was that Muhammadiyah would support the ""best son"" of Indonesia to be president. Tanwir is an assembly of Muhammadiyah ulema and leaders.

The tanwir gave sound advice, not only to Muhammadiyah members, but to the entire population.
The syuriah of the NU did the same thing. They did not discriminate against certain people, but provided wise guidance for NU members. In contrast, the fatwa from ulema of the NU on 3 June, and the fatwa from Muhammadiyah in February 2004 are a kind of partisan fatwa. This kind of edict is often regarded as unreasonable and unintelligent guidance for the umat.

Usually, more than one fatwa is issued for a single problem -- fatwa on jihad in Afghanistan, or fatwa on Ajinomoto food seasoner, for instance. People who do not agree with a particular edict can ask a certain religious authority to issue a different fatwa. It is, thus, no wonder that we find contradictory fatwa on one case.

Fatwa from different religious bodies, such as the Muhammadiyah, the NU and the Indonesian Ulemas Council (MUI), and Islamic scholars do not have the same religious authority. Hence, people can choose the fatwa that suits them best, based on their own rationalization.

Fatwa does have religious, political and social implications. However, its implications usually affect only the members and followers of the religious bodies, and the ulema that issued the edict. Although a fatwa functions as a legal opinion, it does not act as law. Nor can it determine punishment, unless the state accommodates the fatwa into state law.

In conclusion, can we claim that ulema who issue an ""unreasonable"" fatwa are critical ulema? We cannot simply give that answer. In their everyday actions, these ulema are good and true believers. It is supposed that they issued such a fatwa wholeheartedly, not critically. They adopt a certain understanding of religion to make their decision. Of course, some ulema may do so critically, but the majority do so consciously. Thus, the fatwa is a reflection of their ideology and understanding of religion.

We cannot easily blame those who use religion in politics. They do not intend to misuse religion for political interests.We must understand them so that we may better understand their religious doctrines and teachings.
 
The writer (najib27@yahoo.com) is a lecturer of the Faculty of Ushul al-Din and Philosophy at Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University, Jakarta

Exclusivism and multiculturalism in Islamic society

The Jakarta Post, Jakarta | Opinion | Thu, June 17 2004, 12:00 AM

Ahmad Najib Burhani, Jakarta

The issue of the implementation of sharia is not of much interest to Indonesian people, whether Muslims or non-Muslims. The April 5 legislative election results are the best proof of this statement.

The Crescent Star Party (PBB), one of the parties that promotes sharia, gained less than three percent of the votes and failed to pass the electoral threshold.

Another Islam-oriented party, the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), avoided this fate, and instead made substantial gains, garnering around 7 percent of the votes, up from the 2 percent it got in 1999, by focusing on more popular themes, such as clean government. The PKS did not include the implementation of sharia in its campaign manifesto.

The issue of the implementation of sharia is also regarded as a risky and sensitive topic in the campaign for the forthcoming July 5 presidential election. Amien Rais, the presidential candidate from PAN (the National Mandate Party), who had a close relationship with radical Islamic movements, does not employ this issue as a campaign topic. He would rather employ the issue of development and the eradication of the corruption.
The proponents and supporters of sharia are small in number. The majority of the Indonesian population, both Muslims and non-Muslims, rejecting the idea. The NU (Nahdlatul Ulama), the country's largest Muslim organization, and Muhammadiyah, the country's second largest Muslim organization, have also rejected the notion.

In spite of their small number, the proponents of sharia have had some success in propagating the notion in Sulawesi, Sumatra, East Java, Banten, Flores, Sumba and in the Bandung area.

There are many reasons why sharia has come to the fore in Indonesian political discourse. Three of these are as follows: 1) the classic and perennial issue for Muslim politicians -- choosing between a theocratic state or secular state, 2) the failures of Indonesian governments, and 3) the global resurgence of Islam.

Now, the question is why, despite the fact that Islam is the majority religion in Indonesia, sharia has not been implemented in this country. Why has the Indonesian population consistently refused to adopt sharia as the law of the land?

Of course, there are many answers to this question. It is said that the majority of Muslims in Indonesia are nominal Muslims. Thus, they are not eager to accept ""total"" Islam in their daily lives. Some say they are not interested in adopting sharia as they are afraid of it.

There is, however, a more sophisticated reason as to why the majority of Muslims in Indonesia reject the implementation of sharia. This is related to the idea of multiculturalism. The implementation of sharia represents the enforcement of a particular social, political and religious identity. This means that other identities are regarded as having inferior values than the dominant identity. The proponents of sharia are of the view that there is only one Islam -- that Islam as a monolithic entity.

In fact, there is tremendous cultural diversity in Islam, or, in other words, there is ""cultural diversity within civilizational unity in Islam"". There are more than four popular schools in Islamic law. There are also numerous schools in Islamic theology. There are various cultural models in Islam; Euro-Islam, Afro-Islam, Indo-Islam, Java-Islam, and so forth.

Even in Indonesia, there are various Islamic parties and Islamic camps. Thus, the enforcement of sharia, and the view of monolithic Islam, goes against Islamic principles that promote pluralism, equality, justice and tolerance.

Instead of promoting sharia, it is imperative to disseminate Islamic multiculturalism. Islamic multiculturalism is the perception of Islam as a blessing for all creatures, Islam as a shelter and an ""umbrella"" for minority groups, rather than a threat and danger for minority groups and other religions. Within Islam itself, actually, there are many groups.

It is no so difficult to see the great number of local cultures that combine to make up Islamic civilization. Thus, promoting multiculturalism means honoring Islam and other religious as well.
 
The writer (najib27@yahoo.com) is a lecturer in the School of Theological Sources and Philosophy at the Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University.

Retrieved from: http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2004/06/16/exclusivism-and-multiculturalism-islamic-society.html