Islamist parties try to be less Islamist

Ariel Heryanto, Victoria, Australia | Opinion | Sat, June 07 2008, 11:24 AM

Fear has prevailed in the lives of Indonesians for much too long. The reign of fear has affected both the state and ordinary people. Cognizant of its credential deficit in both Islamic politics and democracy, successive governments have felt compelled to demonstrate sympathetic gesture to the Muslim communities, sometimes stronger than actually believed.
To appreciate better the argument presented above, it is worth comparing the behaviors of the past and present governments with those of former president Abdurrahman "Gus Dur" Wahid. With abundant Islam credentials in hand, never at any time did Wahid need to prove that he was pro-Islam. So much so that he could afford to demonstrate the opposite. Instead of calling for jihad against the enemies of Islam, Wahid did almost the extreme opposite.
Flamboyantly he displayed some of the best possible favors a Muslim leader could do for minority groups in a Muslim-majority nation. Not only did he restore the ethnic Chinese's civil right to celebrate the Chinese New Year, he even went as far as claiming to have some distant Chinese ancestry.
In contradiction to the repressive rules and regulations from the old regime, Wahid supported inter-religious marriage. He offered a public apology to the victims of the 1965 killings and their families, as well as to the people of East Timor for violence the previous government had committed.
Until last April, my observation of Islamization was narrowly focused on its effect on the secular state in Muslim-majority nation such as Indonesia, and by extension Malaysia and Pakistan. But two recent and separate analyses have helped me see things in a broader perspective. The first comes from Iran-born Amir Taheri, and the second comes from India-born Sadanand Dhume. Both are well traveled, and both have worked for years as journalists.
In his article, "Why Islamists Don't Win Elections?" first published in The Wall Street Journal, Amir Taheri offers a long list of cases from many countries where the Islamization of political parties has consistently led to election defeats, including Malaysia, Indonesia, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Afghanistan, Iran and Turkey. His conclusion is unequivocal:
"So far, no Islamist party has won a majority of the popular vote in any of the Muslim countries where reasonably clean elections are held. Often, the Islamist share of the votes has declined. In Malaysia, the Islamists have never gone beyond 11 percent of the popular vote," Taheri wrote.
"In Indonesia, the various Islamist groups have never collected more than 17 percent. The Islamists' share of the popular vote in Bangladesh declined from an all-time high of 11 percent in the 1980s to around 7 percent in the late 1990s. Even in once-Taliban dominated Afghanistan, Islamist groups, including former members of the Taliban, have managed to win only around 11 percent of the popular vote on the average. In the Middle East and Arab nations Islamists don't fair much better," he wrote.
It was my understanding that in response to perceived threats from the opposition Partai Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS) in the late 1970s, the incumbent United Malays National Organization (UMNO)-dominated government underwent a face-lift, trying to appear to be more Islamic than PAS.
I used to believe this at least partly explains UMNO's resilience. Successive governments in Indonesia followed suit. But Taheri shows the last elections in Malaysia gave the opposite outcome. PAS won more seats (from 6 to 23), while UMNO suffered the most severe defeat since 1969. Why? According to Taheri, UMNO's Badawi played "the Islamic card, while PAS leader Abdul Hadi Awang went in the opposite direction".
Similar trends can be observed in Indonesia. Since his electoral victory in 2004, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) has become increasingly Islam-oriented. In contrast, the most overtly and strongest Islamist party, the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), has consistently traded in its Islamist look and agenda for more inclusive strategies and rhetoric. Two questions follow. Has Malaysia's PAS taken the lesson from the PKS? And why have President SBY's advisers not taken the lesson from Badawi's defeat?
Sadanand Dhume is more pessimistic than Taheri or myself about the possible outcomes of global Islamization. One country where Islamization has been the focus of Dhume's examination is Indonesia. What has worried Dhume is not just the safety of one or two minority groups currently under attack. Rather, as he writes in a column in the Journal, "(w)hat kind of country does Indonesia want to be? Will it be, as its founding fathers envisioned, a land where people of all faiths live as equals, or one where non-Muslims and heterodox Muslims are effectively second-class citizens? Will it be a country that respects an individual's right to worship as he pleases, or indeed not to worship at all, or one where such matters are determined by safari-suited officials and bearded clerics? Will it be ruled by the law or by the mob?"
At first, that sounds a very common concern among many moderate and liberal Indonesians for the past few years. Dhume has just published his first book, My Friend the Fanatic, a product of four years of travel in many parts of Indonesia and conversations with people of diverse backgrounds. The book's title refers to an important figure in Islamist circles who traveled with him and helped him open the doors to other Islamist leaders and supporters.
In late May, Dhume visited Sydney and Melbourne for a writer's festival and a series of promotional activities for his book.
At the risk of being rude, I asked him what precisely is "new" in his contribution to the ongoing debate over this matter. His response was firm and fresh: "My contribution stems from a skeptical view of religious belief that is extremely rare or non-existent in Indonesia. I don't believe that we should tiptoe around our opposition to terrible ideas even if they cloak themselves in the legitimacy of religion. This starting point sets me apart from the liberal mainstream in Indonesia."
Describing himself as a liberal and atheist, Dhume distanced himself from both the political left and right. To answer my question, he added: "(w)hat is lacking in Indonesia is the space to be openly skeptical of religion. Religious discourse is effectively a kind of protected discourse. Now while I admire groups like JIL (Liberal Islam Network), I also believe that you can't win the important arguments that need to be won with fundamentalists simply by trading interpretations of scripture."
The situation that both Taheri and Dhume perceptively analyzed has been made possible by the systematic annihilation of the left in Indonesia since 1965. The absence of the intellectual left has also been significantly responsible for the lack of irreligious criticism of religious orthodoxy and other violent-inclined vigilantes in the name of a religion.
The writer is a senior lecturer in the Indonesian Program, the University of Melbourne, Australia. He can be reached at arielh@unimelb.edu.au
 

http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2008/06/07/islamist-parties-try-be-less-islamist.html

When governments try to look more Islamic

Ariel Heryanto, Victoria, Australia | Opinion | Fri, June 06 2008, 1:15 AM

The use and abuse of Islamic politics by the Soeharto government (1966-1998) and his immediate successor in transition, BJ Habibie (1998-1999), have had more damaging consequences than generally noted. In 2004, when completing my book, State Terrorism and Political Identity in Indonesia (Routledge, 2006), I raised the issue but did not give enough emphasis. The book focuses on the impacts of the 1966 massacres and subsequent anti-communist witch hunt upon public life in the 1990s.
The book mentions in passing the impact of that murky past has also been partly responsible for other inter-ethnic conflicts across the nation in the 2000s with no reference to 1965 or anti-communism. Since then it has become increasingly clear that further study is needed to examine how and the extent to which the same past has been responsible for the politics of religion since the 2000s.
After more than a decade of repressing political Islam, Soeharto found himself in a radically changing political climate. He was increasingly alienated from the military as an institution, and Islam was on the rise at home and globally.
He was cognizant that further repression would only backfire, if not be suicidal. In a spectacular political U-turn, in 1990 he hurriedly Islamized himself and his government apparatus in a wide range of policies and actions.
To build his Islamic credentials from scratch, that year he went to Mecca for the first time for the pilgrimage, and returned as a haj. In the same year he sponsored the founding of the Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI), embracing a wide range of important figures among Islam-oriented social organizations, professionals, academics and political activists who may not necessarily have agreed with each other on a number of issues.
Far from feeling manipulated by the government, as some critics argued back then, these Muslim intellectuals saw the invitation to collaborate with the regime as the first opportunity in many decades to gain due recognition. It appeared to be a golden opportunity to compensate for what had been denied or repressed, namely Islam as an important moral, intellectual and political power to be reckoned with.
Only months before the founding of the ICMI, Islamic political prisoners were released en masse well before their jail terms were up. In direct contradiction to its own policy of not issuing any new permits for print media companies, the government supported the publication of the overtly Islamic daily Republika. The ban of the wearing of the jilbab was also lifted. Immediately after, Soeharto's eldest daughter began appearing in public wearing a headscarf. The number of new mosques soared, and the parliament house was described by locals as remarkably "green-ized".
Until then it had been difficult for pious Muslims to express their identity and religious piety, due to the vigorous stigmatization of Islamic politics as "extreme right". From 1990 the situation was completely reversed: one had to be careful not to be seen as anti-Islam. Indonesian courts were busy prosecuting individuals who made public statements deemed disrespectful of Islam.
The banning of the country's first and commercially most successful tabloid, Monitor, and subsequently the prosecution of its editor, Arswendo Atmowiloto, were among the first and most eventful in a long series of similar cases involving a crackdown on media outlets seen as having been disrespectful of Islam.
Violent attacks against houses of worship belonging to religious minorities became regular events, despite criticism and attempts among moderate Muslims to stop such actions.
More consequential than all of this was Soeharto's decision to make a dangerous liaison with the more violent-inclined segments within the diverse Muslim communities. His short-term intention was probably to mobilize the latter to counter the pro-democracy movement that was putting increasingly greater pressure on him to resign.
But perhaps more than he could anticipate, care or control, the effects of this move were immense and refractory. None of the above saved Soeharto from losing his grip on state power. Reluctantly, he transferred his presidency to vice president Habibie, who soon become the next target of attacks from the pro-reform movement.
Seriously lacking legitimacy in public, Habibie and the few surviving generals continued what Soeharto had initiated, only this time on a larger scale and more aggressive fashion. New state-sponsored militias were officially trained and deployed to confront physically the agitated pro-reform activists.
These militias did not only act in defense of the new president and surviving generals, but also in the name of Islam. Being anti-Habibie was declared to be the same as anti-Islam, according to their slogans and banners. As in Soeharto's case, these militias did not help rescue Habibie's presidential seat. Worse still, they inadvertently aggravated the politicization of religious faith to a level unprecedented in the history of this country.
But unlike its predecessors, which had no hesitation from the outset to adopt violent means to achieve similar ends, the current government has as yet restricted its project of building a pro-Islamic image in cultural and technological spheres.
But before breathing a sigh of relief, one needs to see how long this government has condoned the illegal act of violence by various militia groups in the name of religion. How much longer will it continue? Not only has this government and its law enforcers give impunity to fairly small but militant groups to go on the rampage, more worrying is that the government, under pressure from other social groups, is seriously considering a ban on Islamic group Ahmadiyah.
More than could be imagined in 1998, by now reformasi has led to the marked Islamization, as much as democratization, of Indonesia. Although they can be compatible and have overlap, the two are not necessarily one and the same thing, as there can be more than two streams of Islam, multiple forms of Islamization and heterogeneous communities of Muslim. The state is expected to play a critical role in striking a good balance and maintaining the wealth of this nation's plurality.
A weak state would allow fear to reign in the public space, especially among the minority, because it also suffers from the very same fear of the risk of acting independently according to the rule of law. In a small way, such rule by fear is well illustrated by the fate of my own April opinion column about the above in Indonesian.
The essay was submitted to a major Indonesian media outlet by invitation for a specific space already allocated in the paper. Hours before the paper went to press, I received a letter from the editor advising me that the column could not be published, as it was deemed "risky".
Interestingly, while the column never saw the light of day in print, it appeared online on the same paper's website. The Indonesian Constitution stipulates freedom of expression, but to date such freedom can only take refuge on the Internet.
Today, the Internet is the only public space where hundreds of thousands of Indonesians can and have actually declared themselves to be religiously "liberal", "atheist" or "agnostic" in their profiles on cyber social networking sites such as Facebook.
The writer is a senior lecturer in the Indonesian Program, the University of Melbourne, Australia. He can be reached at arielh@unimelb.edu.au.
 

http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2008/06/05/when-governments-try-look-more-islamic.html

Bamusi Ingin Berdayakan Masyarakat Islam yang Nasionalis

Sabtu, 08 Oktober 2011 17:40

Baitul Muslimin Indonesia (Bamusi) yang merupakan salah satu organisasi kemasyarakatan yang ingin memberdayakan masyarakat Islam secara nasionalis, dalam upaya menjagi empat pilar kebangsaan untuk memperkokoh persatuan dan kesatuan. "Baitul Muslimin Indonesia pada hakekatnya murni organisasi kemasyarakatan yang ingin menyampaikan syiar Islam dalam keranga nasionalis berbangsa dan bernegara dengan menjunjung tinggi toleransi beragama", kata Ketua Umum Bamusi Prof. DR Hamka Haq MA pada acara halal bi halal keluarga besar Bamusi se Sumatera Utara, di Hotel Grand Antares Medan, Sabtu (1/10). Hamka mengatakan, dalam kerangka demokrasi saat ini, Bamusi kita harapkan mampu memberikan manfaat dalam kehidupan berbangsa, bernegara dana beragama dengan tetap menjaga ukhuwah Islamiyah baik sesama muslim maupun non muslim dengan mengedepan Pancasila sebagai bentuk perwujudan manusia Indoensia seutuhnya. Hamka mengatakan, Bamusi bukan merupakan ormas Islam yang radikal dengan mengedepankan kekerasan dalam bertindak, tetapi kehadiran Bamusi ingin memberdayakan ummat Islam agar mampu bersaing menghadapi era globalisasi dan perkembangan Iptek saat ini. "Bamusi yang merupakan salah satu sayap Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan, akan berupaya memberikan kontribusi secara nyata dalam membangun bangsa dan negera ini", kata Hamka yang juga merupakan salah satu Ketua DPP PDI Perjuangan yang membidangi pendidikan budaya dan keagamaan. Sementara itu Ketua Bamusi Sumut Anwar Noor Siregar dalam sambutannnya mengatakan, halal bi halal seperti ini merupakan suatu bentuk keakraban yang patut terus dibangun, dalam upaya menjagi komitmen organisasi untuk membangun manusia Indonesia yang nasionalis tetapi agamais. Dalam kepengurusan Bamusi kata Noor Siregar, tidak ada kader yang ingin jatuh menjatuhkan, apalagi sampai mengkerdilkan seseorang hanya untuk kepentingan pribadi atau kelompok. "Bamusi dalam kehadirannnya di tengah tengah masyarakat Sumatera Utara telah banyak memberikan dampak positif bagi pembangunan di daerah ini. Terutama dalam membangun kaidah-kaidah keagamaan yang berdemokrasi dengan tetap berpegang teguh kepada Al Qur’an dan hadist serta empat pilar kebangsaan", kata Noor. Secara terpisah Penasehat Baitul Muslim Indonesia H.Alamsyah Hamdani SH mengatakan, ke depan Bamusi sebagai organisasi kemasyarakatan yang juga merupakan salah satu sayap partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan mampu memberikan kontribusi bagi pembangunan di Sumatera Utara , terutama dalam membangun demokrasi dan kaidah-kaidah agama. Acara yang bertemakan, Melalui Halal bi halal Kita Wujudkan masyarakat Muslim yang Demokratis, menghargai kebhinekaan dan toleransi terhadap sesama, dihadiri Wakil Ketua DPRD Sumut M. Affan Sos dan ratusan undangan.  (di) sumber:www.analisadaily.com http://pdiperjuangan.or.id/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=662:bamusi-ingin-berdayakan-masyarakat-islam-yang-nasionalis&catid=74:bamusi&Itemid=124 ----------- Struktur, Komposisi dan Personalia Pengurus Pusat Baitul Muslimin Indonesia Senin, 05 Desember 2011 18:26    Sebagai hasil dari Penyempurnaan Struktur, Komposisi dan Personalia Pengurus Pusat Baitul Muslimin Indonesia (PP Bamusi) tersebut, Ketua Umum DPP Partai Demokrasi Indonesia, Megawati Soekarnoputri, melantik PP Bamusi bersama-sama dengan Badan Pemberdayaan Ekonomi Kerakyatan, dan Departemen Keuangan dan Perbankan di Kantor DPP PDI Perjuangan Lenteng Agung Jakarta Selatan, pada tanggal 13 Oktober 2011 lalu. Dalam sambutannya, Ketua Umum PDI Perjuangan Megawati Soekarnoputri menyatakan PP Baitul Muslimin diharapkan dapat sebagai wadah penangkal radikalisme dalam agama, terutama Islam di Indonesia. Menurut Megawati, radikalisme di lapangan bentuknya kekerasan, seraya menekankan bahwa kekerasan tidak menyelesaikan persoalan namun malah memunculkan persoalan. “Kami ingin, di Indonesia ini kalangan beragamanya tentu harus bisa saling mengenal, saling berkomunikasi, dan tercermin dalam sikap-sikap begitu,” tandas Megawati. Pelantikan Pengurus Pusat Baitul Muslimin Indonesia (PP Bamusi) dihadiri antara lain Dewan Pembina, H.M. Taufiq Kiemas yang juga Ketua MPR-RI, Ketua Umum PBNU, KH Said Aqil Siradj, yang juga merupakan salah satu Dewan Pembina PP Baitul Muslimin, Sekjen PDI Perjuangan, Tjahjo Kumolo, Sekretaris Dewan Penasehat, Achmad Basarah yang juga anggota FPDI Perjuangan DPR-RI, Amir Moeis dan Maruarar Sirait. Berikut Struktur, Komposisi dan Personalia Pengurus Pusat Baitul Muslimin Indonesia (PP Bamusi) yang masa baktinya mengikuti masa bakti DPP PDI Perjuangan, yakni 2010-2015: I. DEWAN PEMBINA                : HJ. MEGAWATI SOEKARNOPUTRI Prof. Dr. SYAFI’I MA’ARIF H.M. TAUFIQ KIEMAS Prof. Dr. K.H. SAID AGIL SIRADJ II. DEWAN PENASEHAT Ketua: Mayjen TNI (Purn) H. CHOLID GHOZALI Sekretaris: Drs. ACHMAD BASARAH, MH Anggota: H. NABIEL MAKARIM Prof. Dr. H. ROKHMIN DHAHURI K.H. BASRI ANANDA dr. H. JUDILHERRY JUSTAM, MA Dr. H. MARWAH M. DIAH, SH, MPA H. MOH. SOBARI MH. SAID ABDULLAH H. IRMADI LUBIS H. ZAINUN AHMADI, SH III. PENGURUS PUSAT KETUA UMUM: Prof. Dr. H. HAMKA HAQ, MA Ketua Bidang Kesejahteraan Umat: SRI RAHAYU Ketua Bidang Keanggotaan/Organisasi: IRVANSYAH, S.IP, M.Si Ketua Bidang Politik: H. ERWIN MOESLIMIN SINGAJURU, SH Ketua Bidang Antar Agama: H. ZUHAIRI MISRAWI Ketua Bidang Dakwah: HELMI HIDAYAT, MA Ketua Bidang Humas dan Media: HAMID BASYAIB Ketua Bidang Kaderisasi/Pelatihan: Ir. ABIDIN FIKRI, SH Ketua Bidang Pendidikan: INDAH NATAPRAWIRA, M.Si Ketua Bidang Hubungan Internasional: FAUZAN AMAR, SH Ketua Bidang Pemberdayaan Muslimat: NAYLA RAGUAN AL-JUFRI, MA Ketua Bidang Ekonom Umat: MAHMUDDIN MUSLIM, SE, M.Si Ketua Bidang Wirausaha: Ir. BUDYARTO LINGGOWIYONO Ketua Bidang Kebudayaan: MUKHLIS PATAHNA, SH, MA Ketua Bidang Hubungan Antar Lembaga: Drs. EDY KUSCAHYANTO Ketua Bidang Pemberdayaan Politik: IDHAM CHOLIED Ketua Bidang Pemuda dan Mahasiswa: H. NASHIRUL FALAH AMRU, SE SEKRETARIS JENDERAL: NURMANSYAH TANJUNG, SE Wakil Sekretaris I: MASKUT CHANDRANEGARA, S.Sos Wakil Sekretaris II: RAHMANI YAHYA Wakil Sekretaris III: HARI APRIATNO, SE, MBA Wakil Sekretaris IV: SUKMA RAGIL SAPUTRA, SE Wakil Sekretaris V: AGUS SUSILO Wakil Sekretaris VI: H. MOHAMMAD NOVA ANDIKA, SE, ME BENDAHARA UMUM: ANDI RIDWAN WITTIRI Wakil Bendahara I: Ir. YUDI SUTARNO Wakil Bendahara II: ALIAH MAISARAH, S.Sos Wakil Bendahara III: RUSLAN ABDUL GHANI Wakil Bendahara IV: AHMAD SALADIN, S.Sos Wakil Bendahara V: MUHAMMAD ARFAN, SE, M.Si Selain itu, pada pertengahan Oktober 2011, Kantor Sekretariat Pengurus Pusat Baitul Muslimin Indonesia pindah ke Jl. Pancoran Timur No. 41 Perdatam Pancoran Jakarta Selatan 12770; Telp. (021) 7974680, Email: ppbaitulmuslimin@gmail.com http://pdiperjuangan.or.id/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&layout=blog&id=74&Itemid=124

Filantropi untuk Masyarakat Madani

Republika, Sabtu, 26 Juni 2004
http://www.republika.co.id/ASP/kolom.asp?kat_id=16

Oleh : Ahmad Najib Burhani

"Sangat banyak organisasi non-profit yang secara finansial stagnan. Mereka menggali dan mendistribusikan dana dengan cara yang sama selama beberapa dekade.... Secara definisi, organisasi non-profit yang mencari profit terlihat seakan kontradiktif. Namun sebetulnya tidak demikian." Bill Shore, Revolution of the Heart

Tulisan Azyumardi Azra di Resonansi Republika (17/6) yang berjudul "Filantropi untuk Keadilan Sosial" sangat menarik untuk dikaji lebih lanjut. Tulisan itu di antaranya mempertanyakan nasib LSM-LSM (Lembaga Swadaya Masyarakat) di Indonesia jika lembaga-lembaga donor dari luar negeri menghentikan bantuannya. Resonansi itu juga menyinggung tentang independensi LSM-LSM yang memiliki ketergantungan kuat kepada pihak asing. Menarik untuk dikaji juga karena tulisan itu menyinggung tentang besarnya potensi dana dari bangsa Indonesia sendiri untuk menggerakkan LSM-LSM.

Potensi dana dari bangsa Indonesia yang dimaksudkan oleh tulisan Rektor UIN (Universitas Islam Negeri) Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta itu terutama adalah dana zakat, infak, sedekah, wakaf, dan hibah
> (Ziswah). Pertanyaannya adalah berkaitan dengan pemanfaatan dana
> Ziswah itu untuk hal-hal yang di luar metode tradisional dalam
> pendistribusian dan pemanfaatan Ziswah. Pertanyaan lain yang tak
> kalah penting adalah bagaimana caranya agar dana Ziswah itu tidak
> berfungsi semata konsumtif atau jangka pendek, tapi dana revolving,
> produktif, berkembang, berfungsi maksimal dan membantu sebanyak-
> banyaknya masyarakat.
>
> Dalam pemahaman dan praktik tradisional, pemanfaatan dana zakat,
> infak, dan sedekah (Zis) biasanya ditekankan pada fungsi relief
atau
> diberikan langsung dalam bentuk uang dan makanan. Sementara wakaf,
> biasanya hanya dalam bentuk tanah dan digunakan untuk pembangunan
> masjid atau madrasah. Delapan kelompok yang berhak menerima zakat
> (ashnaf) yang terdiri dari fakir, miskin, amil, gharim (orang yang
> berhutang), mualaf, ibnu sabil, sabilillah, dan budak biasanya
> menerima langsung bantuan tanpa tersistematisasikan dengan baik.
Ini
> adalah model pemahaman skripturalis atau tekstualis dari ajaran
> agama. Memang, cara-cara tradisional itu masih perlu dilakukan
dalam
> konteks masyarakat di Indonesia.
>
> Banyak warga negeri ini yang masih membutuhkan bantuan yang
bersifat
> segera. Namun cara ini harus diiringi dengan upaya-upaya
pemberdayaan
> atau pengentasan kemiskinan yang sistematis. Pemberdayaan itu
> dilakukan agar orang-orang yang lemah bisa terentaskan dari
> kemiskinannya secara permanen, bahkan meningkat statusnya menjadi
> muzakki (orang yang berzakat), bukan mustahik (penerima zakat)
lagi.
> Terlebih lagi, potensi dana zakat yang menurut Zaim Saidi (2003)
> mencapai Rp 7,5 triliun per tahun tentu sulit untuk bisa membantu
> banyaknya jumlah orang miskin di Indonesia. Berdasarkan laporan
Bank
> Dunia, dengan garis kemiskinan yang digunakan adalah 2 dolar per
> hari, maka pada tahun 2002, sekitar 55,1 persen dari penduduk
> Indonesia masuk dalam kategori miskin. Dari angka itu dapat
diketahui
> bahwa lebih dari 100 juta penduduk Indonesia adalah orang-orang
yang
> berhak menerima bantuan dari harta zakat yang potensinya mencapai
Rp
> 7,5 triliun tersebut.
>
> Upaya-upaya pemberdayaan
> Sebetulnya, praktik dan program pemberdayaan untuk mewujudkan
> keadilan sosial telah dilakukan oleh beberapa lembaga dengan
> menggunakan dana Ziswah. Hanya saja informasi ini belum banyak
> diketahui oleh masyarakat. Di samping karena informasi tentang
> penggunaan dana Ziswah di media massa dan laporan-laporan
penelitian
> lebih ditekankan pada kegiatan yang bersifat charity atau services
> (pelayanan), lembaga-lembaga pengelola Ziswah sendiri juga sangat
> minim mengungkapkan kegiatan-kegiatan pemberdayaan mereka kepada
> publik.
>
> Dompet Dhuafa Republika (DDR), misalnya, memiliki beberapa program
> pemberdayaan masyarakat. Program-program itu di antaranya adalah
> Ittara (Industri Tepung Tapioka Rakyat), TDS (Ternak Domba Sehat),
> Lembaga Keuangan Mikro yang berupa BMT (Baitul Maal Wattamwil),
> Swalayan, Depo Pengasong dan Grosir, Masyarakat Mandiri (MM), UHT
> (Usaha Hasil Tani), Budidaya Pisang Terpadu, dan Toko Amanah Liwa.
> Bahkan, LSM ini menyalurkan lebih dari 50 persen dana yang
> diterimanya untuk program-program pengentasan kemiskinan melalui
> upaya pemberdayaan.
>
> Meski memberikan penekanan pada aspek ekonomi, namun pemberdayaan
itu
> ditujukan juga kepada aspek kehidupan yang lain, seperti agama,
> politik, dan sosial. DDR berusaha untuk menciptakan pemberdayaan
yang
> bersifat terpadu. Masyarakat diberi modal dan dilatih untuk
mandiri.
> Mereka juga dididik untuk memiliki dan mengembangkan nilai
kejujuran,
> kerja keras, dan bertanggung jawab. Tanpa upaya pemberdayaan yang
> terpadu, maka kemandirian masyarakat yang tercipta akan mudah roboh
> lagi. Program Masyarakat Mandiri (MM), misalnya, ditujukan untuk
> memberdayakan masyarakat paling miskin di suatu daerah tertentu.
>
> Pada awalnya, program ini dilaksanakan di 10 desa di wilayah
Jakarta,
> Bogor, Tangerang, dan Bekasi. Namun saat ini baru empat desa yang
> berhasil diberdayakan, yaitu desa Rancalabuh (Tangerang), Buana
Jaya
> (Bogor), Suka Wijaya (Bekasi), dan Muara (Teluk Naga). Kegiatan
yang
> dilakukan di desa-desa itu antara lain pelatihan, pemberian mikro
> kredit, dan advokasi, atau pendampingan secara intensif. Dari
proses
> awal memasuki desa-desa tersebut hingga mereka menjadi mandiri
> diperlukan waktu lebih dari 4 (empat) tahun.
>
> Kini desa Rancalabuh, misalnya, telah menjadi daerah peternakan
bebek
> dan penghasil telur bebek yang cukup maju dan produktif, di samping
> memiliki usaha-usaha lain yang mampu membebaskan masyarakat dari
> kemiskinan. Program-program yang dilakukan oleh DDR di atas adalah
> program-program ekonomi riil dan banyak persamaannya dengan program-
> program yang dilakukan oleh LSM-LSM.
>
> Bedanya, program-program yang dilakukan oleh DDR didanai oleh
> masyarakat Indonesia sendiri, tidak bergantung pada bantuan asing
> yang kadang dicurigai memiliki kepentingan-kepentingan tertentu.
> Program-program itu tidak saja berhasil menciptakan kesejahteraan
> ekonomi orang-orang miskin, tapi juga meningkatkan kesalehan hidup
> mereka, kesadaran terhadap demokrasi, dan juga kepedulian untuk
ikut
> membebaskan saudara-saudaranya yang masih dalam kondisi papa.
Social
> entrepreneurship (SE) Sekarang, bagaimana caranya agar dana sosial
> itu bisa revolving, produktif, dan mampu membebaskan masyarakat
> miskin sebanyak-banyaknya?
>
> Bila sumbangan dari negara-negara asing bisa berhenti, maka dana
> zakat sebetulnya tak bisa berhenti selama umat Islam masih ada.
> Persoalannya adalah bagaimana agar dana zakat yang potensinya Rp
7,5
> triliun itu bisa, idealnya, membebaskan lebih dari 100 juta
penduduk
> miskin di Indonesia. Dalam konteks dana sosial non-Ziswah,
bagaimana
> fungsi sosial tetap dijalankan, namun dana tidak habis terpakai,
tapi
> justru terus berkembang. Dari sinilah lantas berkembang konsep
> tentang social entrepreneurship (SE) atau kewirausahaan sosial.
> Istilah SE adalah istilah baru, diciptakan pada dekade belakangan
> ini.
>
> Namun demikian, ide dan praktik-praktik SE sudah diterapkan sejak
> dahulu. Istilah ini digunakan untuk menggambarkan tentang
penggunaan
> prinsip-prinsip bisnis atau wirausaha dalam praktik-praktik
> pengabdian sosial, memperlakukan usaha dan lembaga sosial dengan
> pendekatan bisnis, menggabungkan kesabaran dalam menjalankan misi
> sosial dengan agresivitas dan ambisi dalam wirausaha. Prinsip-
prinsip
> wirausaha itu dinilai sebagai cara yang efektif dan efisien dalam
> mengemban misi sosial sehingga hasilnya bisa maksimal dan
menjangkau
> target yang luas.
>
> Lantas, apa perbedaan antara social entrepreneurship (SE) dan
> business entrepreneurship (BE)? Orientasi dari BE adalah materi,
> uang, dan keuntungan pribadi. Sementara orientasi SE adalah misi
> sosial. Di sini, tempat misi sosial adalah sangat sentral. Kriteria
> keberhasilannya bukan seberapa banyak kekayaan dan harta yang
> dimiliki, tapi seberapa besar dampak sosial yang diraih. Kekayaan
dan
> materi itu hanyalah sarana untuk mencapai misi sosial. Lagi-lagi
> upaya yang dilakukan oleh DDR perlu dijadikan contoh. Ittara
> (Industri Tepung Tapioka Rakyat), TDS (Ternak Domba Sehat), Depo
> Pengasong dan Grosir, UHT (Usaha Hasil Tani), dan Budidaya Pisang
> Terpadu adalah beberapa program milik DDR yang memiliki kemiripan
> dengan SE.
>
> Usaha-usaha itu memang menghasikan kekayaan. Namun kekayaan itu
> ditujukan kepada orang-orang miskin yang menjadi konstituennya.
> Ittara, misalnya, pada awalnya adalah industri tepung tapioka milik
> masyarakat Lampung yang tertatih-tatih dan mau mati. DDR lantas
> memberi modal, pelatihan, dan bantuan pengelolaan. Industri ini
> menggunakan tenaga-tenaga orang miskin yang ada di sekitar lokasi
> pabrik. Melalui proses yang panjang, akhirnya Ittara mampu bersaing
> dengan industri-industri besar milik para konglomerat dan menjadi
> percontohan di daerah Lampung.